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Federal  Reserve  System.The  Clearing  House  Interbank  Payments  System:
Description  of  Its 0perations  and  Risk  Manaqement
1.  General  0vervjew  of the System
The  Clearing  House  Interbank  Payment  Systenr  (CHIPS)  is a high-speed
message-s\4itching  network  owned  and  operated  by the New  york Clearing  House
Assoc'iation  (NYCHA)  to clear jnternational  dollar payments.  Based  'in  New  york
Cit.y, CHIPS  was  developed  in the late 1960s  as an  e'lectronic  replacement  for  a
paper-based  payment  system,  the Paper  Exchange  Payment  System  (PEPS),
PEPS  provided  an  effective  clearjng  arrangement  but the paper-based
strtrcture  was  unable  to handle  the rapidly  growing  volume  of paynents  that
needed  to be  cleared. The  growth  in payment  volume  was  partial'iy the resu'lt  of
the growth  of the Eurodollar  market.l The  change  in foreign  exchange  rate
r For  a discussion  of the
Eurodol  lar market,  see  Sarkjs
I  nternat  i  ona'l  Bank  ing, Praeger
causes  for the surge  in the
J. Khoury,  Dynamics  of
1980,  p.24-6.regine  from  fjxed to floating rates jn lg73  also ljkely jncreased  the volume  of
internationa.l  payments  that needed  to be cleared.
In response  to the growing  volurne  of internationdl payments  the NYCHA
developed  the Clearing  House  Interbank  Payments  System  (CHIPS).  The  crucial
Jifference  between  CHIPS  and  PEPS,  its paper-based  predecessor,  is that CHIPS
is an  electronic-based  payment  system  cdpable  of handl  jng higher  volumes  of
payments.  CHIPS  began  operations  with only  9 NYCHA  participants  and  processed
800,000  transactions  with a total value  of $1  trillion  in 1921,  its first  full
year  of operations. ln 1974,  it  expanded  its operation  to 56  participants  by
taking in all  the former  participants  of PEPS.  Partjcipation  continued  to rise
during  the late 1970s,  stabilizing at about  140  in the mjd-1980s.2  In l9BB,
CHIPS  processed  34  million transactions  worth  $165  trilljon,  (See  Appendix  A
for annuai  vol  unes.  )
tsecause  CHIPS  originated  from  a paper-based  system,  it  initially  retained
some  of the characteristics of that system,  such  as next-day  settlement.  But
as demond  of participants  and  the ava.i  lability  of technology  have  changed  over
the years,  CHIPS  has  also  changed.  In 1981,  it  adopted  same-day  settlement. In
1984,  it  began  incorporating  risk-management  measures  that are  monitored  in
real time, something  only possible  on  an  electronjc  network.
Il.  Legal  Framework  for  the System
Twelve  New  York  money-center  banks  make  up the membership.of  the NYCHA,
each  of which  is represented  on  the Clearing  House  Committee  that establishes
z  In 1980,  a morator.ium  on new  participants was
The  reason  for  the moratorium  was  the need  to expand
capac'ity  and  to resolve  some  legal issues  before  new
could be added. That  noratorium  was  lifted  in 1983.
.imposed  .
computer
part  ici  pant  s3
the ru1es  for the operation  of CHIPS.  (See  Appendix  B for a list  of members.)
The  Ciearing  House  Committee  chooses  an  executive  vice president  who  enforces
the rules and  oversees  all operations  of the clearing  house. The  basic
framework  for the operations  of CHIPS  is presented  in the Constitution  of the
New  York  Clearinq  House  Association  and  in the Rules  Governing  the Clearing
House  Interbank  Payment  System  as adopted  by I{YCHA.  I'ionnember  of NYCHA  must
agree  to abide  by CHIPS  rules before  being  allowed  to partjcipate  in the
system,
Any  financial institution can  apply  to participate  in CHIPS  if  it  meets
several  mlninum  requ  i  renents.
l)  Participants  must  be  either a commercial  banking  institution, an  Edge
Act corporation,  or a banking  affiliate  of a commercial  banking
'jnstitution  located  in New  York  City.  In addition,  the parent
company  of  an Edge  Act corporation or an lnvestment  Company  as
defined  by New  York  State Banking  Lab,  may  become  a substitute
participant  thereby  providing  the greater  financial strength  of the
parent  in place  of its eligible subsidiary.
2)  Pdrticipants  must  be  subject  to regulation  by the New  York  Srdte
Banking  Departnent  or a federal bank  regulator.
3)  Participants  nust  also  agree  to transmjt  their messages  to CHIPS
through  a primary  connection  located  in New  York  City or a backup
connection  located  in the greater New  York  metropolitan  area.
4)  In addition,  there  must  be  located  in New  York  City an  officer of the
participant  institution who  is authorized  to make  bindjng
commitnents  to CHIPS  whi.le  CHIPS  is operating.
5)  Final1y,  potential  participants  must  provide  CHIPS  with currentfinancial statements  for themselves  and  any  parent  companies.  The
annual  financial review  process  is not specified,  but CHIPS  seeks  to
maintain  financial'ly  strong  participants  to mininize  any  risks to
the assoc  iat.ion.
The  rules governing  the operation  of CHIPS  are  established  by the Clearing
House  Committee  and  any  changes  in these  rules must  be approved  by a majority
0f the members  of the association. These  rules are administrated  by the
executive  vice president  of the cleaning  house. The  executive  vice president
can  enforce  these  rules through  his/her power  to suspend  or term.inate  a
participant  from  CHIPS.  The  decisions  of the executive  vice president  can  only
be  appedled  to the Clearing  House  Committee.
All  participants  are  governed  by  the sane  rules.  There  is no  distinctjon
nade  between  foreign and  domestic  banks. Furthennore,  there is  no explicit
distjnction made  between  members  of the NYCHA  and  other.participants.  However,
the i2 NYCHA  members  wrjte the rules that govern  all  participants. l4hile  the
nonmernber  participants  can  provide  input  to important  cledring  house  decisions,
ultimately  the decision  wilI be  made  by  the twelve  members.
III.  Structure,  operations  and  Administration
0n a normal  business  day,  CHIPS  operates  from  7:00  a.n. to 4:30  p.m.
with settlement  usually  completed  before  6:00  p.m. CHIPS  closes  for bank
hol  idiiys as set by the State of New  York  and  observed  by the Federal  Reserve
Bdnk  of New  York  (FRB-NY)  over  whose  books  CHIPS  settles,  If  CHIPS  is closed
for a holrday  not celebrated  in Europe,  CHIPS  operates  for extended  hours  on
the next  busjness  day,  beginning  at 5:00  a.m.  and  ending  at 5:00  p.m.  The
extended  hours  accommodate  the addjtional volume  generated  by fore.ign  banks  on5
the day  that CHIPS  was  closed.  The  hours  of operation  may  also be extended  or
changed  by the executive  vice president  as needed.
Payment  messages  sent  over  CHIPS  are  credit transactions,  i.e. the message
directs CHIPS  to debit the sender's  account  and  credit the receiver's  account.
All messages  are initiated by  the institution sending  funds. The  payment
message  includes  at least  the identity of the sender,  the identity of the
sending  institution, the amount  of funds  to be  transferred,  the identity of the
receiving  institutjon and  finally the receiver's  beneficiary  account  identity.3
More  information  can  be included  if  desired, which  may  be important  to the
senoer  to expla.in  jn detail the purpose  of the payment  to the receiver.4
A payment  message  can  be either sent or stored  on CHIPS.  A message  can  be
stored  on the CHIPS  computers  for release  later the same  ddy,  A stored  message
can  be  deleted  by the sending  participant,  Alternatively,  a payment  message
can  be sent inmediately.  In either case,  once  a payment  is  sent it  is
'irrevocable  and  represents  an  unconditiondl  obligation  of the sending
institutjon.  The  ob.l  igation is binding  regardless  of enor,  settlement
fdilure, on  even  bankruptcy  of either the sender  or the sending  institution.5
CIIIPS  trti.l  izes a two-tier settlement  Drocedure.  In order  to understand
" often participants  send  or recejve  messages  for their own  dccounts. In
these  cases  the sender  and  the sendjng  institution  are one  in the same  as are
the receiver  and  the receivinq  inst'itution.
4 Conmercia.i  payments  ro.  it',ip*.nt, received  are often
adjusted  for damaged  goods  or other  returns.  Oetails  explaining
what  invoices are covered  by a particular payment  can  be useful
in completing  the transactj  on.
E '  tlhen  a payment  is  sent in error,  it  is  'left to the two
part.icipants  to reach  a negotiated  settlement  to resolve  the
error.  The  negotiation is outside  the CHIPS  system. There  are
accepted  conventions  as to the appropriate  charges  paid for
errors usually in the form  of foregone  interest.o
the operation  of the settlement  it  is  important  to know  the four basic entities
involved  in clearing  and  settling a payment  through  CHIpS:  participants,
sett'l  ing participants,  CHIPS  as the processing  entitJ and  the Federal  Reserve
Bank  of New  York (FRB-NY)  across  whose  books  settlenent is accomp.l  ished in a
special  settlement  account. The  participants  are  those  financial institutions
that dre perrnitted  to send  and  receive  payment  messages  over the comnunication
network  established  by CHIPS.  CHIpS  itself  is only a high-speed  message
switching systen  and  a set of accounts. An important  subset  of the
parLicipants  are  the sett'l  ing  participants. These  settling participants  are
the only par!icipants  dble  to nake  or receive  transfers  over  Fedwire  into or
oul of the special  CHIPS  account  at the FRB-NY.6  They  act as  correspondent
banks  rcr  the other part.icipants  and  make  settlement  transfers that settle
thejr  own  accounts  and  the accounts  of other participants that settle through
them. Each  settling participant  either makes  a sjngla,.transfer  jnto or
receives  a single  transfer  from  the special  account  maintained  for CHIPS  at the
FRB-NY.  The  single  transfer  settles the entire day,s  transactjons  for the
settl  ing participant  and  all of its respondents.
The  participants can  be categorized  into three groups, The  most  numerous
are the U.S. agencies  and  branches  of foreign banks. These  foreign
participants  account  for 105  of the 140  partjcipants  in CHIpS.  The  large
number  of foreign participants reflects the fact that CHIPS  was  deve.loped
prinarily  to handle  forejgn payments,  and  these  paynents  contjnue  to make  up
tne vast majonity  of payments  sent over CHIPS.  The  second  category  are the
fourteen  U.S.  domestic  institutions that are nonsettling  participants. Many  of
6
Federa  I
Fedwire  .is the wire transfer system  operated  by the
Reserve  System.I
these  participants are the rnajor  tl.S. regional banks  that partjcipate through
Edge  Corporations  located  in New  York  City.  Final  1y  there  are the 21  domestic
settl ing participants. The  settling participants  are  primarjly  New  york
money-center  banks. Thirteen  of the settling participants  settle only their
own  account  and  the renaining  eight provide  set  ement  services  to as few as
rhree  or as many  as  twenty-sjx  nonsettiing  particjpants.
The  CHIPS  communicatjon  network  is a single-node  network. All
participants  are  connected  d.irectly  to a single  message-switching  center,
CHIPS.  Participants  provide  services  in turn to third-party  custoners
including  nonparticipating  respondent  banks. Messages  are  often received  in a
preformatted  electronic  form  and  resent  by the participant  through  CHIpS.
Edch  messdge  sent  through  CHIPS  causes  the sending  participant,s  account
to be  debited  and  the receiving  participant,s  account  to be  credjted.  In
addition,  cHIPS  maintains  a sophisticated  set of account.s  needed  to enforce  its
rjsk-management  system,  which  is described  jn detail in section  VI, and  to
pl'ovide  its participants  with necessary  information  to monitor  their risk
exposures.  In particular, accounting  information  is maintained  for each
participant  relative to every  other  particjpant  and  for every  third-party
customer  of a participant that has  been  assigned  a benef  ic'iary account
i  de  nt  i  fi cdt  i  on.
The  CHiPS  inquiry system  permits  a particjpant  to obtain  the status  of al.l
the incoming  and  outgoing  payments  wjth respect  to an jndjvidual  account
serviced  bJ the participant.  In addition,  the participant  can  also  obtain  the
sLatus  of its current  net credit or debit position  vis-a-vis all  other  CHIpSI
1
participants,'  Finally, a participant  'is  permitted  to obtain  the net net debit
or credit pos'ition  of any  other  participant  whenever  CHIpS  is open.8
The  payments  transferred  on  CHIPS  are  prjmarily international  in nature.
A survey  of one  day's  transactions  on  CHIPS  wds  conducted  by the FRB-Ny,9  The
survey  indicated  thal over  82  percent  of CHIP5,  dollar vo1ume  of payments
occurred  in foreign  exchange  and  Eurodolldr  placement  transactions, The
distribution of CHIPS  payments  by  type  of transactjons  .is  presented  jn Table  l.
The  predominance  of  international transdctions  is not unexpected  since two-
thirds of CHIPS  participants  are branches  and  agenc.ies  of foreign  banks.
'  The  participant  net debjt or credit position  with respect
to another  participant  is the sun  of all the funds  it  has
received  from  thdt panticipant  less  the sum  of all  the funds  it
has  sent  to that participant.  If  this difference  is positive,
the participant  is in a net credit position, and  .if the
difference  is negative,  the participant  is jn a net debit
position.
" A participant's  net net debit or credit position  is the
sum  of dll  the funds  it  has  received  less  the sum  of all  the
funds  it  has  sent.  If  this difference  is positive. the
participant is in a net net credit position,  and  if  the
difference  is negative,  the participant  is.in a net net debit
pos  iti on.
- 
- 
!..  "Ldrge-dol  lar Payment  Flows  from  New  York,,  Quarterly
Revieb/  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of New  York, vol,  12 (Winter  IggZ+S)
p. 9-13 and  "A Study  of Large-Dolldr  Payment  Flows  Through  CHIPS
and  Fedwjre"  (a bound  paper,  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of Nelv  york,
December  1987).v
Table l.
Distributjon of CHIPS  transactions  by type
(  Percent  )
Fore  i  gn I xc  h  ange
Eurodc,  il ar Pl  dcements
Sett  lement
Commercial  & Mi  sc.
Bank  l_oan
Securi  t ies Purchase/
Redempt  i  on/
F  i  nanci  ng
Federal  Fund  s
Source:  "Large-dol  lar  Payment
Reserve  Eank  of New  York,  vol.
Flows  from  New  York"  Quarterly  Review  Federal

















Little  is known  about  the specific  bank  custorners  that use  CHIpS  to
complete  payments  beyond  anecdotal  information  frorn  individual banks  dnd  the
FRB-NY  survey.  The  survey  indjcated  that approxinately  90 percent  of the
transdctions  involving  Eurodollar  placements  or foreign  exchange  originated
from  offices outside  the U.S,10  The  customers  in these  transactions  were
I;sted as banks  but it  is unknown  .if these  banks  are  carrying  out transactions
on  their own  behalf  or on  behalf  of their commercial  custoners. In the foreign
exchange  transactions  the transfers were  concentrated  in spot contracts for
German  marks,  Japanese  yen and  the Britjsh pounds.
the  need  for reliability  in an  electronic  payment  network  is well
recognized  by CHIPS,  which  has  made  extensive  efforts to ensure  continuous
10  Tn. d"finition of originating  outside  the U,S.  deserves
explanation.  The  survey  respondents  were  instructed to treat
foreign  offices of all  banks  (lncluding  their own)  as being
"foreign  customers'r  and  treat U.S.  offices of foreign  banks  as
bei  ng "domest  i  c crrstomers.,'t0
operations.  In addition to a second  conputer  system  at its  primary  site  that
can  maintain  operations  at the primary  site in the event  of a single  computer
failure,  CHIPS  has  a third ident.ical  computer  located  at a back-up  site.  CHIpS
uses  "remote  logging"  dt that site to back  up  the messages  sent  on its primary
system,  dnd  it  could  activate  the back-up  system  and  conduct  business  in a
matter  of hours. CHIPS  also  mainta.ins  two  overlapping  independent
communicat'ion  networks  to connect  participants to the CHIpS  computer.
CHIPS  requires that each  participant maintain  both  a primary  and  a back-up
site for thejr connection  to CHIPs.  Each  site is connected  directly to both  the
primary  CHIPS  processjng  site and  the back-up  CHIPS  site.  AlI connections  are
through  high-speed  lines and  communication  multiplexers  with ',d.ial  back-up,l
ijnes offering yet another  level of redundancy.
CHIPS  also has  extensive  contingency  p1ans. In the event  of a power
failure,  CHIPS  has  a battery-based  reserve  and  a dual d.iesel  generator  system
to generate  its own  electrjcal power  as  needed.ll By  CHIpS  own  assessment,
"Operational  problens  dre  now  near  zero;  uptjme  is consistently  in the 99%  to
100%  range."  Durjng  1988,  uptime  averaged  99.9?/,  and  operational  probjems
,/,ithin  CHIPS  caused  oniy a sing.le  jnstance  where  the CHIPS  closjng  hour  was
delayed  (for a total of 90  minutes).
In recovering  its costs,  CHIPS  acts ljke a cooperative.  Tota.l  costs  for
the CHIPS  operation  are  determined  and  then  allocated  to all  participants  based
on  their usage. The  expenses  are  assessed  nonthly  based  on  the number  of
messdges  sent  dnd  received  during  the previous  month. There  is a mininum
assessment  of $2,500  per month. This nrethod  has  resulted in an average  cost of
,- The  CHIPS  processjng  facility  also  has  environmental
controls to prevent  or minimize  any  problems  resulting fron
excess  heat or humidity, water  leakage,  or fire.11
$.29 per message  sent or received.  Consequently  a comp.lete  transaction  would
cost twice  that or $.58.
Participants  also incur  costs  for participating  on  CHIPS  that are not part
of the expenses  charged  by CHIPS.  Each  participant must  majntain  two locations
for  the transmission  of payment  nessages  to CHIPS  in the New  York  City area  and
the staff t0 operate  these  offices.  In addition,  an  officer of the
partic.ipating  institution that 'is  authorized  to take  appropriate  act'ion  on
behalf  of the partic.ipant  in connection  with its CHIPS  operation  must  be
available  in New  York  City during  all  hours  that CHIPS  is open  and  until  CHIPS
settles at approximately  6:00  p.m-  each  business  day.  Participants  recover
these  riosts  either through  profits  generated  fron executing  their  own  payments
over  CHIPS  or through  fees, both  implicit and  explicit, charged  to their
customers.
IV.  Settlement  and  Fi  nal  i ty
CHIPS  is a net net settlenent  or a multilaterai net settlernent  payment
system."  Payrnent  messages  are sent al  I day  but there is no transfer of funds
1) "  A single  net settlement  system,  also  known  as a b.i  lateral
net settlement  system,  would  require one  transfer between  every
pail'wise  combination  of participants on a payment  system  that
dealt with each  other.  A net net settlement  systen, also knov.rn
as a multilateral  net settlement  system,  reduces  the nunber  of
transfers to just one  transfer either sent or received  by each
participant to a central dccount. In a t|{o tiered settlement,
some  participants  in a net deb.it  positjon  send  their transfers  to
the central account  indirectly through  settling partjcipants.
After receiving  these  transfers,  settling participants  in a net
debit position send  a transfer to central account  designated  by
the payment  system. For a further exposition  of different types
of settlement  systens  see  David  L. tlengle,  ',0ay1ight  0verdrafts
and  Payment  System  Risks" Economic  Review,  Federal  Reserve  Eank
of Richnond,  Volume  7113  (May/June  1985)  p.15 and  Group  of
[xperts on Payment  Systems,  "Report  on ]letting Schemes'r  mimeo  #
BIS/PG/207E,  Bank  of  international Settl  ernent  (January  1989).t?
until  settlement  tjme.  During  a norrnal  day,  CHIPS  rnaintains  the set of
dccounts  and  at 4:30  p.m.  it  closes  the CHIPS  system  to messages.  By  4:45  p.m.
ChIPS  informs  every  participant  of its net net position  and  each  settling
participant  of the net net posit'ions  of the participants  for which  they
1?
se[tle-'"  A participant's  net net position  is the sum  of credits received  less
[ne sum  of the pdyments  (debits)  sent.  If the net net position  is negative,
the participant  is said  to be  jn a net debit posit.ion  and  is requ'ired  to
transfer funds  to the CHIPS  settlement  account  at the Federal  Reserve  Bank  of
New  York  in order  to settle its accounts.  If  the participant  is a nonsettling
participant  then  it  nakes  this transf  eLi nd  i  rect  l  y through  a settling
participant.  Settling participants  in net debit pos.itions  make  their transfers
directly .into  the CHIPS  settlernent  account  at the FRB-NY.
By  5:30  p.m.  all  the settling participants  should  have  agreed  to settle.
The  settling particjpdnts  in a net debit position  transfer  funds  into the
settlement  account  by 5:45  p.m-  0nce  all  the funds  have  been  transferred into
the account  by settling participants,  CHIPS,  actlng  as agent  of FRB-Ny,
transfers  funds  to all  settling participants  in a net credit position.  Once
the transfers  are  completed,  CHIPS  informs  all  participants  that settlement  is
completed  which  norma.l  ly occurs  before  6:00  p.rn.
l? '"  Participants  are  also jnformed  of their net position  $/ith
respect  to each  other  CHIPS  participant.  This information  can  be
useful in reconciling  the participants  accounts  $/jth  CHIpS
accounts.
A settling participants  net net position  js the sum  of the
credits it  has  received  less the payments  it  has  sent  plus  the
sum  of the net net posjtions  of the participants  for which  it
sett  I  es.13
Chart  1.
CHIPS  Settlement  Time  Tab  I  e*
4:30  p.m.  CHIPS  closes  to current  day  payment  traffic.
4:45  p.m.  CHIPS  informs  all  participants  of their net net posjtions.
5:30  p.m.  By  this time  all  settling participants  agree  to settle,
5:45  p.m.  The  settl  ing  partjcipants  in.fet net debit positions  transfer
funds  into the CHIPS  account  at the Federal  Reserve  Bank  of New
york.
6:00  p.m. By  this time  CHIPS,  acting  as agent  of the Federa1  Reserve  Bank
of New  York,  has  transferred  funds  to all  settl  ing pdrticipants
in net net credit positions  and  CHIPS  informs  a1l participants
that settlenent is comD  I  ete.
* =  These  times are approximate  wjth each  successive  step beginning  as soon  as
the previous  one  is finished.
Even  though  the settlement  is not completed  untjl  the end  of the day, many
CHIPS  participants  permit  their customers  receiving  funds  to resend  those  funds
over CIIIPS  or Fedwjre  prior to settlement,  Payment  nessages  over CHIpS  are
irevocable obligatlons  of the participant.  If  sett.lement  were  not to occur
and  the funds  anticipated at sett.lement  were  not received,  these  participants
cannot  retrieve these  transfers  and  are  still  obligated  for any  funds  released
over  CHIPS  or Fedwire.
CHIPS  has  addressed  the possibility of a participant  not being  able  to
settle by a special  rule that effectively reruns  the day,s  payments  nessages
removing  a1i messages  initiated or received  by the participant  that is failing
to settle.  In effect, application  of this process  ,'unwinds"  that participant
from the system. (The  unwind  procedure  is d'escribed  in Appendix  D.)
There  has  never  been  a settlenent  failure  and  unwind  on CHIPS.  However,
settlement  failures have  been  simulated  in order  to test the ability  of the
system  to implenent  an unw.ind  and  to determine  the impact  of an unwind  on
settlement.  The  results of these  simulatjons  show  that an actual unwind  may  be
extrernely  compljcated  with positions  differing substantjally  from  orig.inal  netI4
net positions,14 Indeed,  as a result of the unwind,  other  participants  may  be
unable  to settle their revised  posjtions,  requiring  further unwinds.  This  risk
of additional  failures is systemic  risk.15
V.  Financial  Structure  of the System
CHIPS  operates  using  intraday,  interbank  credit. t,lhile  CHIPS  is not a bank
and  hold no depositsr  CHIPS  transfers represent an extension  of  jntraday
credit from  the receiving  participant  to the sending  participant.16 The
recejving  participant  accepts  the payment  message  realjzing  that it  wjli  not
receive  the funds  until settjenent  is completed  at the end  of the day.17
Intraday  credit is essential  to the operation  of CHIPS. All participants
begin  each  day  with a zero  ba1ance  and  debits  and  credits are  Dosted
simultaneously.  In such  a system,  no  transactions  could  occur  unless  there
14  See  Davio  B.
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utureS15
were  suff.icient  credit, j,e.  a wil'l  ingness  to accept  payments  messages.18
The  level of intraday  credit withln CHIPS  is the sum  of net credit
positions  of all  participants  in a positive  net credit position,  It  can  rise
and  fal.l during the day  depending  on the flow of payment  messages.  The  average
level of  intraday  credit !,as  calculated  for  a two-tveek  period  from Febrrlary  9-
2?, 1989, During  this period,  the average  level of intraday  credit was  $43
lri  llion.  The  extension  of this credjt occurs  early in the day.  By  8:15  a.m.,
nearly  $30  biliion of intraday  credit has  been  extended.  The  levei of  intraday
credit rjses smoothly  until  late morning  when  at 1l:30  a.rn.  it  peaked  at a.lmost
$5q  njttion.  Following  the peak  it  declined  smoothly  to less  than  $34  billion
dt 4:30  p.m.  (See  Append'ix  E  for the complete  data  on intraday  credit.)
Since  the participants  on  CHIPS  utjlize only intraday  credit, it  is
difficult  to cornpare  the treatment  of this type  of cred.it  to other  bank  credit.
The  credit extended  through  CHIPS  never  dppears  on a balance  sheet  because
Dalance  sheets  are based  on  end-of-day  figures.  In general,  credit extended  to
other depository institutions for the purposes  of clearing payments  is  treated
differently than  other  types  of bank  credit.  Indeed,  credit for clearing
payments  is not bound  by U.S.  legal lending  limjts that restrict credit
extended  to a single  entity to not exceed  10  percent  of capital.
The  amount  of intraday  interbank  credjt currently  utilized to make
payments  over CHIPS  is  large.  The  Federal  Reserve  calculates the day.l  ight
overdraft leve.l  on CHIPS  as the sum  of the rnaxirnum  net debit positions of each
pdrticipant  during  the day.  In September  1988,  the average  'level  of .intraddy
18  oft.n
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that the sender  will  cover  any  net debjt
settlement.  Such  credit does  not appear  on dny
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interbank  lending  on  CHIPS  was  $45  billion.  The  comparable  credit extended
over  the Federal  Reserve  System's  Fedwjre  for funds  transfer  was  $55  billion.
The  current  fjnancial structure  of CHIPS  settlenent  creates  a risk, albeit
small,  of a substantial  potential loss.  If a particjpant  were  to unexpectedly
fail  during  the day,  it  would  be  unable  to settle its CHIPS  account  at the end
of the day.  |,lhile  there  has  never  been  a settlement  fajlure, simulations  of
settlement  failure .indicate  that systernic  failures could  result and  the impact
of systemic  failures wou.ld  be large.  These  simulations  indicated  that d
settlement  failure could  result in the failure of over  one  third of the
partjcjpants  to settle, and  the "unwindrr  would  affect 30  to 40  percent  of the
paymenr  messages  senr  over  CHIPS.19  These  paynents  are still  consjdered
obligatjons  of the sending  participants,  but these  participants  nay  not be in a
position to meet  these  obl  igations.
V1.  Liquidity and  Credit  Risk  Issues
Payments  can  be made  by a variety of means:  cash,  check  or wire transfer.
0ften, tne choice  to utilize  a wire transfer  or other  ldrge-dollar  payment
system  is based  on  the high  degree  of finaiity  of payment.  Finality requires
three characteristics.  F'irst, the payments  must  be irrevocable; payment
messages  sent  on  CHIPS  rneet  this criteria,  Second,  the settlement  of the
payment  must  be  timely.  CHIPS  utjlizes same-day  settlement,  which  reduces  the
possibiiity of a participant  failing between  the time  that a payment  message  is
sent dnd  when  settlement  is completed.  The  possjb'i  lity--however  remote--of  an
un'i/ind  does  raise some  questions  as  to whether  settlement  will  indeed  be
time.ly. Third, if  any  event  should  disrupt  settlement,  there  must  be  a clear
19  S.u  Humphrey  (  1986)  .L7
determination  of which  parties will  bear  any loss and  whether  there are
sufficient resources  available  to absorb  the loss.  CHIPS  has  a well-defined
systen  for  how  settlenent is to be completed  in the event  of a participant
fail'ing to settle, but the ability to determine  how  losses  wilt  ultimately  be
spread  'in  the event  of a settlement  fajlure is not certain.  It  is the
uncerrainty  $/ith  respect  to these  last two  characteristics  that CHIPS  is
current)y  addressing  jn order  to improve  finality.
Liquidity risk in a payment  system  is the poss.ibility  that a participant
will  not have  suffjcient funds  in liquid assets  needed  to settle its position.
lt.is  important  to note  that liquidity risk does  not jmp'ly  that a participant
is insolvent,  but only illiquid  at that particular  moment  'in  time.  Each
participant  is responsible  for its own  l'iquidity in order  to settle.  Settling
particjpants  are not required  to provide  liquidity to the part.icipants  for
which  they  settle,  As  a practical  matter,  the settl'ing  participants  may
provide  iiquidity to other  participants  to expedite  the settlement  process,  but
this is a business  and  credit decision  not addressed  by CHIPS  rules and
procedures.
liquidity problems  usually  result from  sudden  and  unexpected  events  that
are often conpletely  unrelated  to the financiai soundness  of the illiquid
partjcipant.  For  example,  il'l  iquidity can  result frorn  operational  problems.  A
computer  failure could  prevent  a participant  from  transfeffing  or receiving
funds.  If  the participant  was  in a large  net debit position  at the tjme  and
the computer  problem  prevented  the participant  from  borrowing  liquid assets,
then  the partic'ipant  cou'ld  be  illiquid  at settlement  time.  It  is atso  possible
that illiquidity  could  result frorn  unexpected  financial demands.  If  a customer
directed  the bank  late in the day  to transfer  a large-dollar  volume  of funds1B
and  if  after sending  the  funds,  the  bank  djscovers  it could not  buy  funds  in
the market  to cover  its position,  then  the bank  would  be iiliqu.id.
Liquidjty risk  among  CHIPS  participants can  be  managed  in severa'l  ways.
The  first  approach  to dealing  with .l  jquidity nisk js to require  participants  to
maintain  a reasonable  level of liquidity,  The  executive  vice president  of the
NYCHA  has  the power  to review  the financial statenents  of d participant  and  to
require  that the participant  improve  its  liquidity  if  it  is percejved  that
there is any  problem. A second  approach  is to avoid  unexpected  demands  on
liquidity.  The  CHIPS  system  is excel.lent  in providing  a on-ljne, real-time
inquiry system  that permits  a participant  to monitor  its  liquidity needs
constantly. It would  also  permit  a settling participant  the ability to
monitor  the net net positions  of the participants  for which  it  set  es.  Third,
the maximum  amount  of liquidity needed  by a participant  is'l imited  by a CHIpS-
imposed  limit on  the mdximun  net debit position  allowed,for  that participant.
This limit,  a net debit cap,  is discussed  in detail below. Furthermore,  CHIpS
requirements  for back-up  terminals  and  operatjonal  reliability  help  minimize
the liquidity risks that might  result from  operational  failure.
The  most  direct solution  to a liquidity problem  for CHIPS  participants  is
to borrow  liquid  assets.  The  primary  source  of settlement  assets is the
federal funds  market. The  depth  of the federal funds  market  in the U.S.
provides  a large  pool  of iiquidity.20
Credit  risk differs from  liquidity risks in that it  js the risk that a
participant  willbe  unable  to settle at the end  of the ddy  becduse  it has
failed during  the day.  The  zero  starting ba.lance  nature  of CHIPS  dictates  that
20 Fo. ,or.  of the CHIPS
of  Iiquid assets  would  be  to
Reserve  '  s discount  window.
participants, an aI  ternat  ive source
request  a loan from  the Federal19
credit must  be extended  among  participants in order for payments  to be
possible. However,  each  CHIPS  participant  timits its exposure  to every  other
pairticipant  by a series  of bilateral ljmits on  the maximum  net payments  it  will
accept  from any  other particjpant.  CHIpS  requires  a'l  I part.icipants  to set
these  limits referred  to as bilateral credit limits.  A participant's  bilateral
net credit linits  can  be  changed  at any  time  and  can  differ for every
participant,  As  a practical  matter,  these  bjlateral ljmits can  be set at zero
ano  sometimes  are for  smaller  particiDants.
Since  the bilateral net credit limit is set by  each  partjcipant, the
participants  can  enter  into private  agreements  to limit risk further or ro
accommodate  another  participants,  needs. For  jnstance,  a riskjer participant
may  provide  col.lateral  to another  participant  in order  to have  a higher  limit,
The  collateral may  take  the form  of compensating  balances.  Alternatively, jt
is possible  for a very  sound  participant  to reach  its.bj lateral credjt l.imit
with respect  to another  participant for  some  reason  such  as a large infrequent
payment. In these  cases,  the participant extending  the credit can  at its
discretion  temporarily  increase  the bilaterdl credit limit  jn order  to
facilitate  transmission  of the payments.
In addition  to the bilateral credit limits, CHIPS  imposes  a net debit cap
on  each  participant.  This  cap  lirnits a participant's  net net debjt position.
The  cap is a proportion  of the sum  of bilateral  credit  limits  extended  to a
participant  by the other  participants.2l The  net debit cap  v.ri  1l change  with a
rl  In its  simplest  form,  the formula  is 5 percent  of the sum
of all  bi  lateral credit Iimits extended  to this participant  by
other  CHIPS  participants.  If other  participants  feel that an
institution has  become  riskier and  have  lowered  their bildteral
credit Iimits, the next  day  the net debit cap  is automatically
I  owered  .one-day  1ag  any  tine the bilateral credit ljmits change.  The  net debit cap
limits the risk exposure  of all  CHIPS  participants  collective'ly  to a s'ingle
parl  i  cj  p  ant.
CHIPS  monitors  all  transactions  against  these  caps  constantly. If  a
payment  message  'is  sent  thdt would  result in the violation of a cap,  CHIPS
stops  the message.  The  message  is queued  until  the net posit.ions  change
sufficiently to permit  the paynent  to be  sent  without  vjolating the cap.  This
real-time  monitoring  .is  extremely  effective, because  credit risk is primarily a
problem  of an unexpected  failure  of a participant.  No  other measures  are
currently  being  considered  to further reduce  credit risk within the system;
however,  CHIPS  is developing  proceeds  to impiove  settlement  finality.  Any
improvement  in finality  reduces  systemic  risk,
VI  I. Audit and  oversjght
The  Federal  Reserve  System  has  stated that 'jt has  three responsibi  lities
with regard  to the U.S.  payment  system. It must  ensure  the reiiability  and
efficiency of the payment  system. In additjon it  must  ensure  that depository
institutions  of al 
.l 
sizes have  access  to the interbank  payment  system.
Finaliy,  and  perhaps  most  importantly,  the Federal  Reserve  must  protect the
payment  system  against  systemjc  disruptions.22  It  i.  the opinion  withjn the
Federal  Reserve  System  that a systemic  disruption of the payment  system  could
hinder the abi.l  ity  of the econony  to conduct  transdctions  and  reduce  real
growth  and  employment  as a result.
22 See  Board  of Governors  of the Federal  Reserve  System,
Contro'l  ljnq Risk in the Payment  System,  Report  of the Task  Force
on Controll  ing Payment  System  risk to the Payment  System  Po1  icy
Committee  of the Federal  Reserve  System  (August  1988)  , p.  12.2I
Supervisory  oversight  of CHIPS  is the joint responsibility  of the Federal
Reserve  System,  Federal  Deposit  Insurance  Corporatjon,  0ffice  of the
Comptroller  of the Cuffency,  and  the New  York  State Department  of Banking.
CHIPS  has  been  examined  annually  on  such  a joint basis  as a bank  service
corporation  every  year since 1979. The  NYCHA  has  cooperated  in these
exami  nat  i  ons  ,
Not  only is CHIPS  examined,  but all the CHIPS  participants  are  examined  as
depository  institutions.  One  of the requirements  of a CHIPS  participant  is
thar it  be subject  to regulation by the New  York  State Banking  Department  or a
federal  bank  regulator. As  a result, the financial conditjon  and  operational
'integrity of each  participant is reviewed  on a regular basis by one  or more
bank  supervisors  to assure  the safety  and  soundness  of the institution.  These
examinatjons  include  reviewing  wire transfer  operations  including  links with
ChIPS.
The  NYCHA  as the operator  of CHIPS  also close.ly  monjtors  the operatjons  of
CHIPS"  As  an  assocjation,  the members  that control  CHIP5  are also  users  of
CHIPS.  As  such,  they  have  a vested  interest in guaranteeing  that CHIPS
continues  to operate  smoothly.  To  guard  agajnst  disruptions  that might  occur
on  CHIPS,  the NYCHA  requires  that CHIPS  part.icipants  regularly  file  financial
statements.23  Furthermore,  the executive  vice president  hds  the power  to
s\rspend  any  participant  on  CHIPS  at any  tjme.24
In addition  to the NYCHA  monitoring  the financial health  of the
parti(ripants,  allthe  participants  have  an interest in monitoring  the findncial
condition of all  other participants that njght send  a payment  to them, As
23  See  CHIPS  Rule  19, section  i.
24  See  CttIPS  Rule  19, section  d.22
discussed  above,  accepting  a payment  requjres  extending  intraday credit.  Each
participant  must  evaluate  the financial condjtion  of other  partjcjpants  when
it  determines  the bilateral credit Iimit jt  will  extend  to that participant.
The  bilateral limits offer perhaps  the  most  dynanjc  forn of financial review
since they can  be changed  at any  time and  are not subject to any  appeal
DroceS  s  .
VI  I  I.  Monetary  Pol  icy Issues
fhe  clearing  of large-dollar  payments  over  CHIPS  has  relatively little
effect on  monetary  policy issues,  primarily  because  it  has  little  or no impact
on  bank  reserves,  through  which  monetary  po1  icy is implemented,  First, CHIPS
is only a message-switching  system.  CHIPS  does  not hold  any  assets,
particularly bank  reserves. Nor  does  CHIPS  hold  deposjts  or other  liabilities.
CHIPS  ooes  maintain  an account  for settlement  purposes"  at the FRB-NY,  but the
account  begins  and  ends  each  day  with a zero balance.25
Interbank  lending  norrnal  ly takes  the form  of federal funds lending  and
does  have  an impact  on nonetary  policy.  However,  only intraday, interbank
credit  is extended  over CHIPS  and  not by CHIPS.  As long  as there is no private
market  for  intraday  credit--  no exp'l  icit  price is charged  for  intraday credit--
2E
The  eff ic'iency  of a large-do1  1ar payrnent  system  may
affect the demand  for deposits,  which  could  have  an  effect on
monetary  policy.  CHIPS,  because  of its  same-day  settlement,
greatly reduces  float  in the payment  system  relative to payment
by check.  Consequently,  to the extent that CHIPS  transactions
displace checks  it  reduces  f loat and  therefore reduces  demand
for monetary  balances. If  on the other hand,  CHIPS  transactions
are not good  substitutes for  checks  and  are more  .l 
ikely the
substitute for wjre transfers on Fedwire,  then there is no
reductjon  in f.loat. In either case,  the effect would  be  very
stable and  predictable and  warrant  little  concern  by monetary
pol  i  cymakers.23
the interaction betv'reen  the market  for  intraday  and  overnight  interbank  lending
is likely to be  minimal  .
tleposits  held  at the FRB-ilY,  however,  are  used  to settle CHIPS,  creating
some  demand  for  such  reserves. The  CHIPS  accounting  system  has  a net ba'lance
of zero  at all  times.  Consequently,  as  one  participant  flay  be  facing  a growing
net net debit position and  therefore  need  a 
.larger 
deposit  at the Federal
Reserve  in order  to enact  settlement,  there  are  other  participants  that are
facing a growing  net net credit position and  can  lend funds  from  their  Federal
Reserve  accounts,26
IX, Competitive  Issues
CHIPS  both conpetes  with and  is a conplement  to the Federal  Reserve
System's  Fedwire  funds  transfer  systern.  0n  a technical  level, Fedwire  is
capable  of handl  ing any  transact'ion  that is cuffentiy being  transmitted  over
CHIPS.  Similarly  access  to Fedwjre  is open  to all  the participants  of CHiPS
although  not all  CHIPS  participants  currently  use  Fedwire  serujces.2T  Key
differences between  the two systems  are jn the degree  of finaljty  offered
(although  CHIPS  ptans  to inprove  finality  rndy  make  this difference  even  less
significant than  it  might  be  now  for some  participants)  and  jn the cost
)R
A participant  monitoring  its  liquidity position  may
perceive  the need  to build reserves  in order to meet  its
settlement.  Many  participants are permitted  to request  a
discount  window 
.loan. 
The  effect on  nonetary  policy, however,
would  be  no  greater  than  any  other  depository  institution
borrowing  from  the discount  wjndow, Furthermore,  the monetary
policy effect could  be  offset easily  with an  appropriate  open
narket  operat  ion.
27 Each  application  to join Fedwire  would  be  judged  on its
own  meflits  on a cdse-by-case  basis.?4
structure for part  I  c.i  pants.
tlith respect  to the cost structure, CHIPS  requirements  for
connect  i  on/back-up  facilities  generally  places  a higher  up  front fjxed-cost
burden  on  participants  than  Fedwire  which  is offset by a generally  lower  per
transaction cost.  Low  volume  users  would  thus tend to have  a preference  for
Fedw  ire  .
Perhaps  more  significantly, however,  is the strikingly different uses  for
the two  systems,  with CHIPS  servjng  an international and  offshore  market  for
dollar  payments  and  Fedwire  very much  focused  on domestic  U.S. pdyments,  For
major  institutions with both  international  and  U.S.  business,  the
conplementarity  of the two systems  seems  to be supported  by dual
participation.  Indeed,  the foreign  bank  participants  in CHIPS  that do not
participate  jn Fedwire  are largely  those  $rjth  little  domestic  U.S.  business  or
limited needs  for dollar funding  within the U.S.  narket.
The  existence  of the two  systen  also  has  beneficial  inpl  ications  for
operatjonal  flexibility  and  reliability.  If  an  institution with links to both
CHIPS  and  Fedwjre  were  experiencing  operational  difficulties  with one  systen
but not the other, the ability to use  an  alternative  path  for payments  could
prove  valuable. Indeed,  substantial  cooperation  exists at all  leve'ls  between
the Federal  Reserve  and  CHIPS.25
Appendix  A.
Annua  l  Volumes  and Dol  Iar Values  0riginated  by CHIPS
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* CHIPS  began  operat  i  ons
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on April  6, 1970  and  operated  for only 18026
Appendix  B.
The  Members  of the l',lew  York  Clearing  House  Association
The  Bank  of New  York
The  Chase  Manhattan  Bank  (National  Association)
Citibank,  N.A.
Chemical  Eank
Morgan  Guaranty  Trust Company  of  I'le!,  york
Manufacturers  Hanover  Trust Company
Irv i  ng Trust Company  *
Bankers  Trust Company
Mari  ne  Midland  Bank,  N.A.
United  States  Trust Company  of l{ew  York
Nationdl  tJestninster  Bank  USA
European  American  Bank
*  The  acquisition of  Irving Trust Company  by The  Bank  of New  York  may  cause
the number  of members  to decrease  by one  if  the banks  are merged.27
Appendix  C.
Li  st of CHIPS  Participants
(to be added  as of March  1, 1989)
lett I inq  Participants
(number  of participants  for which  this participants  settles is in
paraent  he  se  s  )
Bank  of New  York  (1)
Chase  Manhattan  Bank,  N.A.  (16)
Ci  t  i  bank,  N.A.  (11)
Chemical  Bank  (  10)
Morgan  Guaranty  Trust Company  (24)
Manufacturers  Hanover  Trust Company  (27  )
llational l,lestminster  Bank  USA  (1)
Irvi ng Trust Company  (16)
Bankers  Trust Company  (19)
Marine  Mjdland  Bank,  N.A.  (4)
European  Ameri  can  Bank  (1)
Fidel  ity Bank,  N.A.  (1)
Mel  lon Eank  N.A.  (l)
Phi  ladelphia  National  Bank  (1)
M&TBank  (1)
IBJ Schroder  Bank  & Trust Company  (1)
First National  Bank  of Boston  (1)
Bank  of America,  N.T.  &  S.A.  (1)
First interstate  Bank  of California  (1)
Fjrst Nationdl  Bank  of Chicago (1)
Conti  nental  Bank,  N.A.  (1)
Nonsett  'l  jng Participants
American  Express  Eank  Ltd.
Standard  Chartered  Bank
l.lestdeutsche  Landesbank  G  irozentral  e
Bank  of Chi  na
The  Sumitomo  Trust & Bank  Co.. Ltd.
Arab  Banki  ng Corporat  i  on
Royal  Bank  of Canada
Hypo-Bank
Swiss  Bank  Corporati  on
Dresdner  Bank  AG
First Wachovia  International  Banking  Corp.
Extebank
Cred  i  t  Su  isse
Banca  Naz  ionaIe  Del  Lavoro
BfG:  Ne$,  York
Bank  Leu  Ltd.
Banca  Nazionale  Del  I  'Agri  co.ltura 'lhe  Yasuda  Trust  & Banking  Co., Ltd.
Banque  I  ndosu  ez
Den  Danske  Bank28
Soci  ete General  e
State Bank  of l{ew  South  llales
The  Saitama  Bank,  Ltd.
The  Kyowa  Bank,  Ltd.
The  Mirsubi  shi Bank,  Ltd.
Gulf International  Bank,  8.S.C.
Skand  inavi  ska  Enskilda  Banken
Bancomer,  S-N.C.
Banco  Portugues  do  Atlantico
Banco  Real
Bank  of Cal  ifornia, N.A.
Banco  Nacional  de  Mex  ico
Bdnk  of New  England,  N.A.
Bdnco  do Estado  De  Sao  Pau1o,  S.A.
0sterre  i  chi  sche  Landerbank  AK
Banco  Bi  lbao  Vizcaya,  5.A.
French  Amerjcan  Banking  Corporati  on
Amro  Bank 'loronto-Domi 
ni  on Bank
Banesto  Bank  i ng Corporation
Deutsche  Bank  AG
State Bank  of V  i  ctori  a
Nederl  andsche  l'l  i  ddenstand  sbank,  N.  V.
Provinsbanken  A/S
The  National  Bank  of Canada
Arab  Bank  L.imi  ted
085  Bank
Nationa  l Austral  ia Eank
The  Industrial Bank  of Japan,  Limited
Cred  ito Ital i  ano
Conmonwealth  Bank  of Austra.l  ia
Bank  of New  Zeal  and
Bank  of Tokyo,  L  i  rni  ted
Sumitomo  Bank,  Li  rni  ted
The  Mitsuj Bank,  Limited
The  Fuj  i Bank,  Linited
Austral  ia & New  Zealand  Bkg.  Group  Ltd,
Northern  Trust Intrl  Banking  Corp.
The  National  Bank  of Kuwait  SAK
Pi  ttsburgh  Nat  ional  Bank
Norwest  Bank  M  inneapol  i  s, N.A.
Dai-Ichj Kangyp  Bank,  Ltd.
The  Taiyo  Kobe  Bank,  Ltd.
The  Tokai  Bank,  Li  mi  ted
Republic  National  Bank  of New  York
State Street Bank  and  Trust Company
The  Daiwa  Bank  Limited
Securjty Paci  fi c National  Bank
Eanco  di Sicilia
Hami  s Trust and  Sav  ings Bank
Comnerzbank  AG
The  Hokkaido  Takushoku  Bank,  Ltd.29
UMB  Bank  and  Trust Company
0.  G. Bank
NCNB  National  Bank  of North  Carolina
Banco  de 
.la 
Nacion,  Argentina
Eangkok  Bank  Limited
The  Long-Term  Credit Bank  of Japan,  Ltd.
State  Bank  of India
Sanwa  Bank  Li  mi  ted
Overseas  Union  Bank,  Ltd.
Banque  Francaise  du Comnerce  Ext.
Bank  of Bermuda  Int'1, Ltd.
Canadian  Irnperial  Bank  of Commerce
National  Westminster  Bank  PLC
Westpac  Banking  Corp.
Den  norske  Cred'itbank
Privatbanken  A/S
The  National  Commercial  Bank
First  American  Bank  of New  York
Banco  di  Napol  i
BHF-Bank
Banque  Nationale  de  Parjs
Credit  Lyonna  is
Kred  ietbank  NV
[Jni  on Bank  of Switzerland
Bayeri  sche  Vereinsbank  AG
Bank  Hapoal  im, B.11.
The  Bank  of Nova  Scotia
Barc.lays  Bank  PLC
Bank  Leumi  Trust Co.  of t{.Y.
Banco  do  Brasi.l  , 5.A.
Brown  Brothers Haffiman  & Cornpany
Banco  Commerciale  Ital i  ana
Midl  and  Bank  plc
Uni  ted 0verseas  Bank
The  Nippon  Credjt  Bank,  Ltd.
Banco  di  Roma
The  Mitsubjshi  Trust  & Bkg  Corp.
CIC-Union  Europeenne,  Intl et C.ie
Banco  Hi  spano  Ameri  cano
Intrl  Conmercial  Bank  of China
Algemene  Bank  Nederland,  N.  V.
Israel Discount  Bank  of New  York
Banque  Panibus
The  Toyo  Trust  & Banking  Co,, Ltd.
Hong  Kong  & Shanghai  Bkg.  Corp.
Bank  of Hawa  ii
Korea  Exchange  Bank30
Appendix  D.
Procedures  for  a Settlement  Fai  lure on CHIPS:  An  ,'Unwind,,
If  a settl  ing  participant  is unwilling  to settle the net net balance  of
one  of the participants  for which  it  settles, the settling participant  must
notify the executive  vice president  of the NYCHA  by 5:30  p.m. The  executive
vice president  notifies the participant  that it  has  one  hour  to arrange  with
either its  settling participant  or a new.settling  partjcipant  to settle its
net net balance. if  that participant  is unable  to find a set  ing participant
to settle folit,  then  a new  revised  settlement  is calculated,  j.e.  an
"unwind."
CHIPS  recalculates  the day's  transactions  but eliminates  any  payrnent
nessages  either sent by or received  by the participant that is unable  to
settle.  Their transactions  are unwound  from  the other transactions  of the day.
Revised  net net positions are calculated  and  reported  to the remaining
participants.  Settlernent  then  proceeds  as it  normally  would  with nonsett.ling
participants  transfening funds  to their settling participants  and  the settljng
participants  in a net net debit position  transfeminq  funds  over  Fedwjre  into
the CHIPS  settlenent  account. Finally, CHIPS  would  lransfer funds  our of the
settlement  account  to the settling partjcipants  'in  a net net credit position
and  declare  the settlement  complete.  The  recalculation  of the settlement  jn no
way  relieves  the participant  that was  unable  to settle of its obligation  to pay
the recei  vi  ng  part'icipants.?1
Append  ix E
Aggregate  Intraday Interbank  Credjt Extended  over CHIPS
(averages  of total  net credit positions over the period February  9,  1989  to
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